09-29-2009, 03:56 AM
So, i wrote this a few months ago for a class on Latin American Politics and thought i would share it with all of you Roadjunkies. Not exactly thrilling stuff, but interesting to some, surely. A bit of an academic argument for a real life issue...
M. J. Lloyd
Ohio State University
Political Science 540.01
June 4th, 2009
The Benefits for Latin America of Potential Drug Legalization
The “War on Drugs” has proven an extremely costly failure. Since the 1980’s, this war has cost countless lives and many billions of dollars, while barely making a dent in supply and certainly doing nothing to influence the indefatigable demand of the United States and developed economies. In the meantime, the producers, smugglers, and purveyors of illicit drugs have become enormously rich, and have used their resources to destabilize countries from the central Andes all the way to the Mexican-American border. While some academic research has looked at the negative effects of drug prohibition and the potential positive outcomes of legalization from the North American perspective, there has been comparatively little systematic analysis of the net benefits available to Latin American nations if these drugs would be legalized. Indeed, the majority of the negative social costs of the illegal drug trade are especially evident within Latin America, such as rampant organized crime and violent street crime, increased political instability and corruption associated with drug money, and the environmental and social consequences of bombings, war, and social displacements. Clearly, drug policy in the western hemisphere needs to be fundamentally reformed. If the United States were to legalize the trade of marijuana, raw coca and cocaine, San Pedro (and its mescaline derivative), and opiates, and if Latin American nations (and other countries worldwide) followed suit, a number of benefits would become evident for the region.
Certainly one of the most critical issues facing the hemisphere currently is the rise of organized crime and drug cartels, most recently in Mexico. Prohibition has kept the price of drugs high, and has created an extremely profitable black market for criminal organizations. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
“The value of the global illicit drug market for the year 2003 was estimated at US$13 bn (billion) at the production level, at $94bn at the wholesale level (taking seizures into account), and at US$322bn based on retail prices and taking seizures and other losses into account. This indicates that despite seizures and losses, the value of the drugs increase substantially as they move from producer to consumer” (UNODC, 2005).
It is because of prohibition itself that these substances gain so much value as they head from producer to consumer, and it is organized crime that rakes in this tremendous profit. It is estimated that in Colombia alone seven billion dollars a year are repatriated and laundered by the drug cartels (TED Case Studies, 1997). There is substantial evidence confirming that drug trafficking organizations are increasingly interconnected with terrorist and guerilla movements in Latin America.
“In Peru, trafficking organizations have formed alliances with guerrilla groups to ensure supplies of materials for processing. The financial and military power of these organizations threatens to undermine the political and economic stability of numerous countries, and indeed the entire international community.” (UNODC, 2005)
What is also clear is that narcotraficantes are reinvesting their immense earnings in guns from the United States, particularly. Tens of thousands of guns cross the border heading south each year as drugs flow north, and many of these weapons end up in the hands of criminals (Talvi, 2009)). These guns can end up as far south as Central and South America, and many eventually fall into the hands of guerillas and terrorists throughout the region. Though drug legalization wouldn’t destroy terrorist networks overnight, it would significantly weaken them financially, depriving them of the immense profits necessary to continue their military operations.
While legalizing narcotics would allow governments in the region to better control their production and distribution, it would also allow them to tax their export, thereby creating a major source of new revenue, while also reducing the military expenses of fighting the drug war. Overall, drugs account for one of the most widely traded commodities in the world (UNODC, 2005). Under the current regime, it is the cartels that monopolize the immense profits of this business, but if drugs were to be legalized, producer nations would be able to tax their export and transit nations would be able to tax their flow through their ports. Though full legalization and taxation of narcotics across an entire region is unprecedented, there is some historical evidence to show that governments can in fact profit extensively from legalizing formally controlled substances and then taxing them. Ironically, the United States’ experience of repealing alcohol prohibition during the depths of the Great Depression is an excellent example of this phenomenon. It was estimated in 1930 that illegal alcohol production and sale was equal to 10% of national GDP, and indeed, by the late 1930’s (once prohibition was ended) alcohol taxation had become 7% of total federal revenues (Meier, 1994). Of course, governments would also benefit financially from the reduced strain of having to fight the drug war itself, especially if by drastically curbing the profits of the cartels and narco-terrorists (and thereby reducing their capacity to arm themselves and support their networks) they are better able to handle large-scale threats to internal security. The potential savings to governments is very difficult to empirically quantify at this stage given the immense range of possible outcomes, but improved security throughout the region will undoubtedly promote economic growth and allow governments to focus more on improving health care, infrastructure, and other critical development issues that plague the region.
Legalizing drugs would also likely reduce the amount of street crime throughout Latin America, and especially in the gang-land cities and drug corridors of Central America. Until recently, the most serious threats to security in the region were large, organized criminal organizations. Though this is still probably the case, recent years have seen drug traffickers switch more toward a terror-cell strategy. Small bands of loosely affiliated street gangs have come to dominate Central American cities and drug corridors, and their reign has led to a sharp rise in murders (Campo-Flores, 2005). Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras now have some of the highest recorded murder rates in the world, surpassing Colombia as the most dangerous country in the region. To what extent street gangs like Marasalvatrucha-13 and M-18 (incredibly violent street gangs imported from the US after leaders were deported back to Central America) are responsible for this violence is somewhat difficult to accurately quantify given the unreliable nature of the local law enforcement and judicial authorities, but the evidence for the violent impact of the drug trade is incontrovertible.
“In fact, the regions of Guatemala with the highest murder rates tend to be those… where organized criminal groups and narco-traffickers are particularly active. For example, despite (or perhaps because) of its isolated and rural location, Petén had the second highest murder rate in Guatemala in 2004, probably due to its role in regional drug trafficking operations.” (Ribando, 2007)
Another unfortunate reality is that more and more “war-grade weapons” such as high-powered automatic rifles were finding their way into Central America as traffickers work to protect their increasing supply of product through the region (Fletcher, 2009)
One major obstacle of anti-drug operations in the region has been the pervasive corruption of the police and politicians involved. The drug cartels have been extremely adept at corrupting and infiltrating the generally underpaid and poorly trained police forces of the region. Often, the police have a direct hand in the trafficking of drugs themselves. Mexico’s police force is particularly notorious for corruption. Often, before attempted “crackdowns” on suspected drug smuggling networks the police have informed the cartels of the impending operation and they have had time to get away. This has forced Mexican President Felipe Calderon to use the military as the only reliable offensive weapon against the police. In some cases, the police smuggle drugs themselves. There are sporadic news reports throughout the region of a single police officer (or occasionally a small group of officers) who took a bribe for providing information to the cartels or who are caught with large amounts of drugs or money (or both), but these occurrences rarely lead to any newfound accountability for the police forces themselves. Though drug legalization probably couldn’t single-handedly eliminate corruption, it would significantly erode the power of the cartels to offer bribes and negatively affect democratic processes (Bassiouni, 1998) It would also allow police officers who aren’t corrupt (and there are surely a few in Latin America) to focus on protecting the civilian population from violent criminals.
The US military has had a hand in internal Latin American affairs for a long time, and the drug war has exacerbated this trend, leading to a number of humanitarian crises in the region. One of the most severe outcomes of the drug war has been consequences wrought by the bombing and dropping of defoliates in growing regions. Labeled “Coca Eradication” or “Drug Eradication” schemes, they have had a horrible impact on the poorest of Latin American civilians. These efforts have also been completely unsuccessful. A March 2005 report by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) indicated that despite record aerial spraying of over 1,300 km² of coca in Colombia in 2004, the total area under coca cultivation remained "statistically unchanged" at 1,140 km (TNI Report, 2001). The effects of chemical bombing on an area are devastating. The crops are ruined and the water is often poisoned. The individual grower has lost his livelihood and the productive value of his farm. He is put into a marginalized position, and is in reality now even more reliant on the drug cartel (or guerillas that control the area) than he was before, as it may be his only access to credit in the short term or job possibilities in the event of his migration to the city. Therefore, such aggressive military-oriented solutions can directly benefit the drug cartels and paramilitary organizations themselves by swelling their ranks against the government forces. Campesinos who are forced to flee their farms after an air raid have few choices, and while many will move onto more marginal land and clear the forest, thereby exacerbating deforestation, climate change, and resource depletion, others will move to the cities, where they will be at great risk of becoming further involved in the drug trade (Leech, 2000). Another unpleasant side-effect of anti-drug bombing is that drug producers have a greater incentive to move into protected areas (such as national parks) where the US Military can’t legally bomb. Coca growers clear old growth jungle in national parks, and then use strong chemicals to process the plant into cocaine, causing significant damage to the local environment, and efforts at chemical bombing do even more damage. While this phenomenon destroys the producer nation’s potential to develop eco-tourism in these region, robbing their economies of billions of dollars, it also weakens the already beleaguered conservation efforts in the region and exacerbates deforestation, water contamination, and ultimately, climate change (Dudley, 2005). At times, the “War on Drugs” takes on utterly absurd dimensions, such as when the US government developed the fusarium oxysporum fungus in an effort to wipe out coca crops in Latin America. In 2000, the US congress approved use of the fungus as a “biological control agent.” Perhaps miraculously, President Clinton at the time realized that unilaterally dropping biological agents over foreign government’s soil would be illegal under the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention, and the plans were cancelled (For more information: TNI Drug Policy Briefing, 2004). In summary, “coca eradication” efforts have done extreme damage to the region’s social, economic, physical, and environmental health, and must be abandoned.
Another way in which the rights of indigenous people are violated by the drug war and drug prohibition is that many of the controlled substances are important sacraments for religious and cultural purposes. Throughout the Andes region in particular, coca has long been a sacrament to the gods and an important tonic against attitude sickness, hunger, and fatigue. It is usually consumed as “mate de coca” or coca tea, and acts as a mild stimulant similar to caffeine. Equating raw coca leaves with cocaine or it derivatives is both scientifically groundless and a violation of cultural rights. The labeling of mescaline derived from San Pedro cactus is another important example of this unfortunate blanket prohibition on drugs. San Pedro has been used for centuries by Andean shamans to achieve spiritual visions. While there has been no real attempt by any of governments in the region to crack down on the San Pedro plant itself, the fact that it is labeled as a controlled substance by the DEA is an affront to traditional cultural practices.
Targeting cartel leaders militarily can sometimes lead to serious international crises, such as flagrant violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity. One example of this was the cross-border attack on suspected FARC leaders by the Colombian military (with American support) in Ecuador in 2008. The attack led to outrage on the part of Hugo Chavez, who massed troops along the Colombian border in a show of strength probably intended to avoid any potential future attacks on Venezuelan soil. Though the diplomatic tensions didn’t result in an all-out war, actions like these further destabilize the region politically, inflame nationalism, and could potentially lead to interstate conflict (Constanza, 2008).
rug prohibition has created a scenario where criminals and traffickers have enormous power to manipulate the lives of people living on the margins of Latin American society. Drug smugglers use a variety of tactics in getting their product safely into the consumer country, from large shipments hidden in packages on ships to submarines to “mules,” or individuals carrying relatively small amounts of drugs across borders. Two common methods of “muling” drugs are illegal immigrants crossing the land border with the US carrying a backpack full of drugs, or travelers attempting to smuggle narcotics through airport security (One common method is to swallow small packages of narcotics wrapped in cellophane and retrieve them later from the toilet. If the packages break overdose is inevitable…). Both options are extremely dangerous for the individual involved, both physically and legally. What is worse is that many of these workers are forced or manipulated into becoming “mules,” and some are children (DEA Congressional Testimony, 2005). Ending drug prohibition would virtually eliminate the incentives of taking these actions.
One overlooked effect of the illegal drug trade on trafficking regions is that narcotics that are not indigenous to those regions tend to fill the streets in great quantity and at rock-bottom prices. This has led to an increase in the consumption of “hard drugs” that wouldn’t have occurred under normal circumstances. One factor exacerbating this trend throughout the region is that “hard drugs” (such as crystal methamphetamine and the horrid “basuca” and “pasta basica” which quickly addict and ruin their users) are often as cheap as (or cheaper than) “soft drugs” such as marijuana or hallucinogenic mushrooms. (Guillermina et. al, 2007) Another reason for the increase in “hard drug” consumption in Latin America is the cultural equalization of all illegal drugs, regardless of the actual health and social risks associated with different substances. Therefore, a habitual marijuana user is considered as much of a “drug addict” as a habitual cocaine or heroin user, though the consequences to that individual and the society at large are certainly not equal between all illegal drugs. While this factor is largely cultural, legalizing and correctly categorizing drugs based on real scientific data would be more helpful to control the rise in “hard drug” use than simply throwing all illicit substances together as equally illegal and dangerous.
As drug producing and trafficking countries have now become major drug consumers themselves, other issues have arisen. One such issue is the steady increase in cases of HIV related to intravenous drug (IVD) users. Prohibition of drugs prevents the effective treatment of drug addiction and the effective administration of preventative measures, such as clean needle banks, which could save the lives of IVD users themselves and many others in society at large that could be exposed to HIV through other forms of close personal contact. Although this issue hasn’t reached the crisis level that it has in places like Eastern Europe, HIV is on the rise in Latin America, and part of this rise is related to IVD use. While research into epidemiology and drug use is limited in Central America, we can get a clearer picture of the interaction of drugs and disease from more developed countries in the region, and the trends are disturbing. There are currently 1.8 million people in Latin America living with HIV/AIDS, and though sexual behavior is still the main factor driving this, IVD use is a growing concern (Aguilar-Gaxiola et. al., 2006).
Proponents of prohibition point toward a probable increase in consumption if drugs are legalized. This concern, though very legitimate in theory, doesn’t seem to hold up when looked at empirically. The argument that drug use will go up is usually two-fold, namely that legalizing drugs will make them cheaper and secondly that legalizing drugs will increase their legitimacy among the public and promote greater use. The first argument barely holds water, at least from the Latin American perspective. Street drugs in Latin America are notoriously cheap and are certainly widely available. In Colombia, a gram of marijuana can cost less than a dollar, cocaine less than $5 and heroine around $10. One would assume given the price structure that Colombia would have one of the highest rates of drug consumption in the world, yet it doesn’t. In fact, Colombia is barely an intermediate-level consumer, and consumption patterns are far lower than North America and Europe. It is more likely that drug legalization will drive up prices, as they will be subject to taxes and the costs of the formal market (Wood, 2009). To what extent this facilitates the continuation of a parallel black market for drugs at the current low rate is impossible to ascertain, but it is clear that legalization probably wouldn’t significantly affect the price of drugs in Latin America. The other side of the argument, that illegal drugs could gain legitimacy, is also deeply flawed. Firstly, in virtually every country in the region, prescription drugs with (possible) recreational uses are available at the local farmacia without any formal documentation or doctor’s prescription. Many of these drugs are actually highly comparable to illegal substances in the same category, particularly among the opiates. There has been little done to regulate this industry, yet the abuse of prescription drugs in Latin American countries is actually lower than in the United States. Given the highly negative cultural connotations in Latin America with regard to drugs and drug users, there is no reason (or empirical evidence) to back up the claim that drug legalization will significantly increase abuse.
It is clear that the current drug policy has managed to do far more harm than good for the vast majority of people in Latin America. Moving toward legalization (and ending the drug war) in both North and Latin America would provide a wide range of benefits to the area, in terms of security, stability, and economic, social, and environmental health. It would weaken the gangsters and thugs that are currently raking in immense profits from the illegal drug trade and would allow governments to better consolidate national territories and social order. Though full legalization isn’t likely to become politically viable in the immediate future, the full range of impacts of drug prohibition on Latin America deserves more consideration among political scientists, policy makers, and citizens throughout the world.
…..
Bibliography.
Aguilar-Gaxiola, Sergio; Medina-Mora, María Elena; Magaña, Cristina G. ; Vega, William A.; Alejo-Garcia, Christina; Real Quintana, Tania; Vazquez, Lucía; Ballesteros, Patricia D.; Ibarraand, Juan; Rosales, Heidi; Illicit drug use research in Latin America: Epidemiology, service use, and HIV; Drug and Alcohol Dependence Volume 84, Supplement 1, September 2006, Pages S85-S93; Scientific Opportunites in Hispanic Drug Abuse Research
Bassiouni; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1998) 1 S.C.R. 982, paras. 104-05.
Campo-Flores, Arian; “The Most Dangerous Gang in America,” Newsweek, March 28,
2005; USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, April 2006
Dudley, Steven; Coca Growing, Eradication both Threaten National Parks; Miami Herald (Miami, FL); November 29, 2005.
Fletcher, Pascal; Central America in Crossfire of Drug War; Reuters News Agency; Miami; March 25th, 2009.
Leech, Gary; The Plight of the Peasant Coca Grower; published online in Colombia Report journal for the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA): 2000
Meier, Kenneth J.; The Politics of Sin: drugs, alcohol, and public policy; Armonk, NY, 1994.
Natera Rey, Guillermina; Juarez, Garcia Francisco; Medina-Mora, Icaza; Maria, Elena Tubercio Sainz, Marcela; Alcohol and drug consumption, depressive features, and family violence as associated with complaints to the Prosecutor's office in Central Mexico; Substance Use and Misuse; 2007; vol. 42, no10, pp. 1485-1504 [20 page(s) (article)] (2 p.)
News from DEA, Congressional Testimony, 11/09/05: http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct110905.html
Ribando, Clare M.; CRS Report for Congress: Gangs in Central America; CRS Foreign Affairs and Trade Division: Washington D.C.; 2007; p. 4.
Talvi, Silja J.A.; Mexico’s Drug War Bloodbath: Guns from US are Destabilizing Country; http://www.alternet.org; March 18th, 2009
TNI Drug Policy Briefing 7: The Re-emergence of Biological War on Drugs; http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?pag...gs_brief7; May, 2004
Transnational Institute Report; The Chemical and Biological “War on Drugs”; http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?pag...scircle-e; March, 2001:
Trade and Environment Database (TED), TED Case Studies: Columbia Coca Trade, Washington DC: American University (1997), p. 4.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2005; (Vienna, Austria: UNODC, June 2005), p. 127.
Vieira, Costanza; Colombia-Ecuador: OAS Rejects Military Incursion; March 18, 2008 IPS News Service: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41639
Wood, Rachel Godfrey; Talking About Legalization Part 1: The Legalization Debate and Drug Consumption in Colombia; Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 2009
M. J. Lloyd
Ohio State University
Political Science 540.01
June 4th, 2009
The Benefits for Latin America of Potential Drug Legalization
The “War on Drugs” has proven an extremely costly failure. Since the 1980’s, this war has cost countless lives and many billions of dollars, while barely making a dent in supply and certainly doing nothing to influence the indefatigable demand of the United States and developed economies. In the meantime, the producers, smugglers, and purveyors of illicit drugs have become enormously rich, and have used their resources to destabilize countries from the central Andes all the way to the Mexican-American border. While some academic research has looked at the negative effects of drug prohibition and the potential positive outcomes of legalization from the North American perspective, there has been comparatively little systematic analysis of the net benefits available to Latin American nations if these drugs would be legalized. Indeed, the majority of the negative social costs of the illegal drug trade are especially evident within Latin America, such as rampant organized crime and violent street crime, increased political instability and corruption associated with drug money, and the environmental and social consequences of bombings, war, and social displacements. Clearly, drug policy in the western hemisphere needs to be fundamentally reformed. If the United States were to legalize the trade of marijuana, raw coca and cocaine, San Pedro (and its mescaline derivative), and opiates, and if Latin American nations (and other countries worldwide) followed suit, a number of benefits would become evident for the region.
Certainly one of the most critical issues facing the hemisphere currently is the rise of organized crime and drug cartels, most recently in Mexico. Prohibition has kept the price of drugs high, and has created an extremely profitable black market for criminal organizations. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
“The value of the global illicit drug market for the year 2003 was estimated at US$13 bn (billion) at the production level, at $94bn at the wholesale level (taking seizures into account), and at US$322bn based on retail prices and taking seizures and other losses into account. This indicates that despite seizures and losses, the value of the drugs increase substantially as they move from producer to consumer” (UNODC, 2005).
It is because of prohibition itself that these substances gain so much value as they head from producer to consumer, and it is organized crime that rakes in this tremendous profit. It is estimated that in Colombia alone seven billion dollars a year are repatriated and laundered by the drug cartels (TED Case Studies, 1997). There is substantial evidence confirming that drug trafficking organizations are increasingly interconnected with terrorist and guerilla movements in Latin America.
“In Peru, trafficking organizations have formed alliances with guerrilla groups to ensure supplies of materials for processing. The financial and military power of these organizations threatens to undermine the political and economic stability of numerous countries, and indeed the entire international community.” (UNODC, 2005)
What is also clear is that narcotraficantes are reinvesting their immense earnings in guns from the United States, particularly. Tens of thousands of guns cross the border heading south each year as drugs flow north, and many of these weapons end up in the hands of criminals (Talvi, 2009)). These guns can end up as far south as Central and South America, and many eventually fall into the hands of guerillas and terrorists throughout the region. Though drug legalization wouldn’t destroy terrorist networks overnight, it would significantly weaken them financially, depriving them of the immense profits necessary to continue their military operations.
While legalizing narcotics would allow governments in the region to better control their production and distribution, it would also allow them to tax their export, thereby creating a major source of new revenue, while also reducing the military expenses of fighting the drug war. Overall, drugs account for one of the most widely traded commodities in the world (UNODC, 2005). Under the current regime, it is the cartels that monopolize the immense profits of this business, but if drugs were to be legalized, producer nations would be able to tax their export and transit nations would be able to tax their flow through their ports. Though full legalization and taxation of narcotics across an entire region is unprecedented, there is some historical evidence to show that governments can in fact profit extensively from legalizing formally controlled substances and then taxing them. Ironically, the United States’ experience of repealing alcohol prohibition during the depths of the Great Depression is an excellent example of this phenomenon. It was estimated in 1930 that illegal alcohol production and sale was equal to 10% of national GDP, and indeed, by the late 1930’s (once prohibition was ended) alcohol taxation had become 7% of total federal revenues (Meier, 1994). Of course, governments would also benefit financially from the reduced strain of having to fight the drug war itself, especially if by drastically curbing the profits of the cartels and narco-terrorists (and thereby reducing their capacity to arm themselves and support their networks) they are better able to handle large-scale threats to internal security. The potential savings to governments is very difficult to empirically quantify at this stage given the immense range of possible outcomes, but improved security throughout the region will undoubtedly promote economic growth and allow governments to focus more on improving health care, infrastructure, and other critical development issues that plague the region.
Legalizing drugs would also likely reduce the amount of street crime throughout Latin America, and especially in the gang-land cities and drug corridors of Central America. Until recently, the most serious threats to security in the region were large, organized criminal organizations. Though this is still probably the case, recent years have seen drug traffickers switch more toward a terror-cell strategy. Small bands of loosely affiliated street gangs have come to dominate Central American cities and drug corridors, and their reign has led to a sharp rise in murders (Campo-Flores, 2005). Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras now have some of the highest recorded murder rates in the world, surpassing Colombia as the most dangerous country in the region. To what extent street gangs like Marasalvatrucha-13 and M-18 (incredibly violent street gangs imported from the US after leaders were deported back to Central America) are responsible for this violence is somewhat difficult to accurately quantify given the unreliable nature of the local law enforcement and judicial authorities, but the evidence for the violent impact of the drug trade is incontrovertible.
“In fact, the regions of Guatemala with the highest murder rates tend to be those… where organized criminal groups and narco-traffickers are particularly active. For example, despite (or perhaps because) of its isolated and rural location, Petén had the second highest murder rate in Guatemala in 2004, probably due to its role in regional drug trafficking operations.” (Ribando, 2007)
Another unfortunate reality is that more and more “war-grade weapons” such as high-powered automatic rifles were finding their way into Central America as traffickers work to protect their increasing supply of product through the region (Fletcher, 2009)
One major obstacle of anti-drug operations in the region has been the pervasive corruption of the police and politicians involved. The drug cartels have been extremely adept at corrupting and infiltrating the generally underpaid and poorly trained police forces of the region. Often, the police have a direct hand in the trafficking of drugs themselves. Mexico’s police force is particularly notorious for corruption. Often, before attempted “crackdowns” on suspected drug smuggling networks the police have informed the cartels of the impending operation and they have had time to get away. This has forced Mexican President Felipe Calderon to use the military as the only reliable offensive weapon against the police. In some cases, the police smuggle drugs themselves. There are sporadic news reports throughout the region of a single police officer (or occasionally a small group of officers) who took a bribe for providing information to the cartels or who are caught with large amounts of drugs or money (or both), but these occurrences rarely lead to any newfound accountability for the police forces themselves. Though drug legalization probably couldn’t single-handedly eliminate corruption, it would significantly erode the power of the cartels to offer bribes and negatively affect democratic processes (Bassiouni, 1998) It would also allow police officers who aren’t corrupt (and there are surely a few in Latin America) to focus on protecting the civilian population from violent criminals.
The US military has had a hand in internal Latin American affairs for a long time, and the drug war has exacerbated this trend, leading to a number of humanitarian crises in the region. One of the most severe outcomes of the drug war has been consequences wrought by the bombing and dropping of defoliates in growing regions. Labeled “Coca Eradication” or “Drug Eradication” schemes, they have had a horrible impact on the poorest of Latin American civilians. These efforts have also been completely unsuccessful. A March 2005 report by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) indicated that despite record aerial spraying of over 1,300 km² of coca in Colombia in 2004, the total area under coca cultivation remained "statistically unchanged" at 1,140 km (TNI Report, 2001). The effects of chemical bombing on an area are devastating. The crops are ruined and the water is often poisoned. The individual grower has lost his livelihood and the productive value of his farm. He is put into a marginalized position, and is in reality now even more reliant on the drug cartel (or guerillas that control the area) than he was before, as it may be his only access to credit in the short term or job possibilities in the event of his migration to the city. Therefore, such aggressive military-oriented solutions can directly benefit the drug cartels and paramilitary organizations themselves by swelling their ranks against the government forces. Campesinos who are forced to flee their farms after an air raid have few choices, and while many will move onto more marginal land and clear the forest, thereby exacerbating deforestation, climate change, and resource depletion, others will move to the cities, where they will be at great risk of becoming further involved in the drug trade (Leech, 2000). Another unpleasant side-effect of anti-drug bombing is that drug producers have a greater incentive to move into protected areas (such as national parks) where the US Military can’t legally bomb. Coca growers clear old growth jungle in national parks, and then use strong chemicals to process the plant into cocaine, causing significant damage to the local environment, and efforts at chemical bombing do even more damage. While this phenomenon destroys the producer nation’s potential to develop eco-tourism in these region, robbing their economies of billions of dollars, it also weakens the already beleaguered conservation efforts in the region and exacerbates deforestation, water contamination, and ultimately, climate change (Dudley, 2005). At times, the “War on Drugs” takes on utterly absurd dimensions, such as when the US government developed the fusarium oxysporum fungus in an effort to wipe out coca crops in Latin America. In 2000, the US congress approved use of the fungus as a “biological control agent.” Perhaps miraculously, President Clinton at the time realized that unilaterally dropping biological agents over foreign government’s soil would be illegal under the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention, and the plans were cancelled (For more information: TNI Drug Policy Briefing, 2004). In summary, “coca eradication” efforts have done extreme damage to the region’s social, economic, physical, and environmental health, and must be abandoned.
Another way in which the rights of indigenous people are violated by the drug war and drug prohibition is that many of the controlled substances are important sacraments for religious and cultural purposes. Throughout the Andes region in particular, coca has long been a sacrament to the gods and an important tonic against attitude sickness, hunger, and fatigue. It is usually consumed as “mate de coca” or coca tea, and acts as a mild stimulant similar to caffeine. Equating raw coca leaves with cocaine or it derivatives is both scientifically groundless and a violation of cultural rights. The labeling of mescaline derived from San Pedro cactus is another important example of this unfortunate blanket prohibition on drugs. San Pedro has been used for centuries by Andean shamans to achieve spiritual visions. While there has been no real attempt by any of governments in the region to crack down on the San Pedro plant itself, the fact that it is labeled as a controlled substance by the DEA is an affront to traditional cultural practices.
Targeting cartel leaders militarily can sometimes lead to serious international crises, such as flagrant violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity. One example of this was the cross-border attack on suspected FARC leaders by the Colombian military (with American support) in Ecuador in 2008. The attack led to outrage on the part of Hugo Chavez, who massed troops along the Colombian border in a show of strength probably intended to avoid any potential future attacks on Venezuelan soil. Though the diplomatic tensions didn’t result in an all-out war, actions like these further destabilize the region politically, inflame nationalism, and could potentially lead to interstate conflict (Constanza, 2008).
rug prohibition has created a scenario where criminals and traffickers have enormous power to manipulate the lives of people living on the margins of Latin American society. Drug smugglers use a variety of tactics in getting their product safely into the consumer country, from large shipments hidden in packages on ships to submarines to “mules,” or individuals carrying relatively small amounts of drugs across borders. Two common methods of “muling” drugs are illegal immigrants crossing the land border with the US carrying a backpack full of drugs, or travelers attempting to smuggle narcotics through airport security (One common method is to swallow small packages of narcotics wrapped in cellophane and retrieve them later from the toilet. If the packages break overdose is inevitable…). Both options are extremely dangerous for the individual involved, both physically and legally. What is worse is that many of these workers are forced or manipulated into becoming “mules,” and some are children (DEA Congressional Testimony, 2005). Ending drug prohibition would virtually eliminate the incentives of taking these actions.
One overlooked effect of the illegal drug trade on trafficking regions is that narcotics that are not indigenous to those regions tend to fill the streets in great quantity and at rock-bottom prices. This has led to an increase in the consumption of “hard drugs” that wouldn’t have occurred under normal circumstances. One factor exacerbating this trend throughout the region is that “hard drugs” (such as crystal methamphetamine and the horrid “basuca” and “pasta basica” which quickly addict and ruin their users) are often as cheap as (or cheaper than) “soft drugs” such as marijuana or hallucinogenic mushrooms. (Guillermina et. al, 2007) Another reason for the increase in “hard drug” consumption in Latin America is the cultural equalization of all illegal drugs, regardless of the actual health and social risks associated with different substances. Therefore, a habitual marijuana user is considered as much of a “drug addict” as a habitual cocaine or heroin user, though the consequences to that individual and the society at large are certainly not equal between all illegal drugs. While this factor is largely cultural, legalizing and correctly categorizing drugs based on real scientific data would be more helpful to control the rise in “hard drug” use than simply throwing all illicit substances together as equally illegal and dangerous.
As drug producing and trafficking countries have now become major drug consumers themselves, other issues have arisen. One such issue is the steady increase in cases of HIV related to intravenous drug (IVD) users. Prohibition of drugs prevents the effective treatment of drug addiction and the effective administration of preventative measures, such as clean needle banks, which could save the lives of IVD users themselves and many others in society at large that could be exposed to HIV through other forms of close personal contact. Although this issue hasn’t reached the crisis level that it has in places like Eastern Europe, HIV is on the rise in Latin America, and part of this rise is related to IVD use. While research into epidemiology and drug use is limited in Central America, we can get a clearer picture of the interaction of drugs and disease from more developed countries in the region, and the trends are disturbing. There are currently 1.8 million people in Latin America living with HIV/AIDS, and though sexual behavior is still the main factor driving this, IVD use is a growing concern (Aguilar-Gaxiola et. al., 2006).
Proponents of prohibition point toward a probable increase in consumption if drugs are legalized. This concern, though very legitimate in theory, doesn’t seem to hold up when looked at empirically. The argument that drug use will go up is usually two-fold, namely that legalizing drugs will make them cheaper and secondly that legalizing drugs will increase their legitimacy among the public and promote greater use. The first argument barely holds water, at least from the Latin American perspective. Street drugs in Latin America are notoriously cheap and are certainly widely available. In Colombia, a gram of marijuana can cost less than a dollar, cocaine less than $5 and heroine around $10. One would assume given the price structure that Colombia would have one of the highest rates of drug consumption in the world, yet it doesn’t. In fact, Colombia is barely an intermediate-level consumer, and consumption patterns are far lower than North America and Europe. It is more likely that drug legalization will drive up prices, as they will be subject to taxes and the costs of the formal market (Wood, 2009). To what extent this facilitates the continuation of a parallel black market for drugs at the current low rate is impossible to ascertain, but it is clear that legalization probably wouldn’t significantly affect the price of drugs in Latin America. The other side of the argument, that illegal drugs could gain legitimacy, is also deeply flawed. Firstly, in virtually every country in the region, prescription drugs with (possible) recreational uses are available at the local farmacia without any formal documentation or doctor’s prescription. Many of these drugs are actually highly comparable to illegal substances in the same category, particularly among the opiates. There has been little done to regulate this industry, yet the abuse of prescription drugs in Latin American countries is actually lower than in the United States. Given the highly negative cultural connotations in Latin America with regard to drugs and drug users, there is no reason (or empirical evidence) to back up the claim that drug legalization will significantly increase abuse.
It is clear that the current drug policy has managed to do far more harm than good for the vast majority of people in Latin America. Moving toward legalization (and ending the drug war) in both North and Latin America would provide a wide range of benefits to the area, in terms of security, stability, and economic, social, and environmental health. It would weaken the gangsters and thugs that are currently raking in immense profits from the illegal drug trade and would allow governments to better consolidate national territories and social order. Though full legalization isn’t likely to become politically viable in the immediate future, the full range of impacts of drug prohibition on Latin America deserves more consideration among political scientists, policy makers, and citizens throughout the world.
…..
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